Assessing the effects of the Mexican drug war on economic growth: An empirical analysis by Bel i Queralt, Germà, 1963- & Holst, Maximilian
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: We thank the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (project ECO2016-76866-
R) and the Catalan government (SGR2014-325; 2017 SGR 644) for financial support. None of the funding sources 
was involved in any stages of this research. We are thankful for comments and suggestions received when a 
previous version of this paper was presented at the First Catalan Economic Society Conference (May, 2017). 
Assessing the Effects of the Mexican Drug War on Economic Growth: an 
Empirical Analysis  
 
GERMÀ BEL AND MAXIMILIAN HOLST 
 
Forthcoming in Southern Economic Journal 
 
RUNNING HEAD: The Mexican Drug War and Economic Growth 
 
AFFILIATIONS:  
Germà Bel. Department of Econometrics, Statistics and Applied Economics. Universitat de 
Barcelona. John M. Keynes 1-11. 08034 Barcelona, Spain. Tel: +34934021946; Fax: 
+34934024573; e-mail: gbel@ub.edu 
Maximilian Holst (Corresponding author). Department of Econometrics, Statistics and Applied 
Economics. Universitat de Barcelona. John M. Keynes 1-11. 08034 Barcelona, Spain. Tel: 
+34934029010; Fax: +34934024573; e-mail: maximilian.holst@ub.edu  
 






Abstract: Mexican President Felipe Calderón took office in December 2006. From the outset, 
his government deployed an aggressive security policy to fight drug trafficking organizations in 
what became known as the ‘Mexican Drug War.’ The policy earned considerable criticism since 
a heavy number of unintended casualties resulted from the frontal assault waged against the drug 
cartels. In this article, we evaluate the effects of the Mexican Drug War on Mexican states’ 
economic growth. To do so, we study the effects of the rise in the homicide rate and changes in a 
state-level approximation of the military budget on economic growth. Using dynamic panel data 
econometrics, we find that while the growth in the number of homicides had negative and 
significant effects on state GDP growth, state military expenditures aimed at fighting drug 







At the end of 2006, Felipe Calderón’s government declared a war on drug trafficking 
organizations (DTOs),1 and ordered the military to take strong action against the drug cartels. 
The military initiated a series of operations targeting the most dangerous drug criminals in 
Mexico. However, the criminals fought back, resulting in thousands of casualties (including, 
criminals, police, the military, and civil population). Indeed, the detention and eventual killing of 
the drug lords left a power vacuum that rival organizations sought to fill, which further increased 
the number of victims.  
From the 1990s through to the mid-2000s, Mexico’s homicide rate had fallen to an all-
time low by 2007 of 8.1 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants (an absolute total of 8,861). Shirk 
and Wallman (2015) claim that if the fall had continued, the homicide rate would have 
eventually reached similar levels to those in the United States (five homicides per 100,000 
inhabitants). However, the homicide rate increased dramatically, reaching a high of 23.0 
homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2011. The Mexican National Statistics Institute (INEGI) 
recorded 121,613 homicides in the country during Calderón’s administration, while during 
Vicente Fox’s preceding administration (2001-2006) the number of homicides was less than half 
(60,162). When Calderón left office, the homicide rate fell slightly for a time, but recently it has 
risen again. Indeed, since the end of Calderón’s administration in 2012, the strategy to fight 
DTOs has not changed significantly. 
                                                 
1 The U.S. National Drug Threat Assessment defines DTOs as “complex organizations with highly defined 
command-and-control structures that produce, transport, and/or distribute large quantities of one or more illicit 





Although there are barely any studies analyzing the impact of this spiraling violence on 
GDP, evidence suggests that foreign direct investment (FDI) experienced a setback in some 
industries (e.g. Mining and Oil Extraction) (Ashby and Ramos 2013). However, this study 
analyzed all Mexican states together, regardless of whether they presented signs of DTO 
violence, and so the setback may be attributable to other factors. Yet, firms and individuals 
settled in dangerous regions have opted to move away to safer areas. According to NRC/IDMC 
(2010), 230,000 people are estimated to have fled their homes (up to 2010). Moreover, various 
countries have issued recommendations to their citizens not to visit certain areas of Mexico 
(Zapata 2011). But whether these factors have affected the GDP growth rate has yet to be 
analyzed. 
Economic variables seem likely to be linked closely to the violence problem. Terrorist 
acts, such as those perpetrated in Spain, Turkey and Israel, have shown that economies suffer 
major setbacks from violence. While the terrorism-related literature can serve as a point of 
reference here, we cannot apply its findings to the case of DTO violence in Mexico, as terrorism 
and drug trafficking are very different in nature. 
Based on the number of victims during Mexico’s recent drug crusade and the opportunity 
costs of government spending on its fight against DTOs, it is reasonable to expect that Mexico’s 
economy was affected by DTO activities. A society that experiences violent acts faces not only 
the costs suffered by those directly and indirectly affected, but also the political and institutional 
costs. Acemoglu et al. (2013) point out that when the relationship between the actors controlling 
institutions and criminals reaches certain levels, a symbiotic relationship may emerge and non-
state actors are able to influence policy decisions. Events in Italy illustrate how criminal 





(Alesina et al. 2016), while Colombia faced the same problem up until the end of the 20th 
century, when the drug cartels of Medellin and Cali were particularly strong.  
A number of studies have analyzed the economic effects of drug-related violence, but 
what we do in this article is to assess the specific impact of President Calderón’s policy aimed at 
fighting DTOs and drug-related violence. To do so, we analyze the effects of increases in drug-
related violence (based on crime rates) and a state-level approximation of the military budget on 
the growth of state GDP per capita. For this purpose, we work in a well-known growth setting, 
using the β-convergence framework, while also considering the possibility of spatial effects 
between states. The objective of this paper is to assess not only how violence deterred economic 
activity, but more importantly how government action in the form of military expenditure 
affected state economic growth. 
To analyze the impact of military expenditure, we approximate state-level army budgets, 
and allocate them based on the crime variables associated with the drug cartels and the fight 
against DTOs. Military spending is to be understood as the army expenditure only, and does not 
include navy or air force expenditure. 
Thus, we make several contributions to the literature: 1) we study how the ‘Drug War’ 
policy affected economic growth in the Mexican states. Although the effects of the violence 
escalated, we focus on the actions implemented by the central government, specifically in the 
form of military expenditure, to tackle the problem of DTOs in the territory. To the best of our 
knowledge, the impact of state-level military spending on the per capita GDP growth rate, 
against the backdrop of the Mexican Drug War, has never been analyzed before. 2) By using the 
β-convergence framework, as developed within economic theory, and by employing dynamic 





violence generated by the presence of DTOs and government attempts to fight drug criminals. In 
so doing, we link the empirical analysis of national security policy with economic theory in a 
more effective way than previous studies examining violence and economic growth in Mexican 
states that fail to consider the dynamic nature of the data. 3) Our approach captures the violence 
generated by the presence of DTOs by employing a range of different variables. We also make 
several approximations of military spending at the state level, given that such information is not 
publicly available in Mexico. To overcome this limitation, we develop a new method to estimate 
military expenditure at the state level in a developing country. By using a range of options for 
both variables, we are able to endow our analysis with greater robustness.  
 
2. Literature Review 
Literature related to Economic Growth in Mexico 
The analysis we undertake of the effects of military expenditure on economic growth in the 
context of the Drug War policy is based on a growth model, and several studies in the literature 
are of particular relevance to the case we present. The speed of convergence of an economy does 
not always remain the same. There will be periods in which convergence accelerates and others 
in which it slows down. Similarly, regional economies within a country may grow at different 
speeds, leading to convergence or divergence.  
Chiquiar (2005), in a study of income convergence across Mexican states, suggests that 
the divergence pattern that emerged in the mid-1980s was not reversed with the signing of 
NAFTA, and that Mexican regions became more sensitive to new sources of growth. Likewise, 
for this same period, Rodríguez-Oreggia (2005) contends that differences in growth across states 





skilled workers than those found in Mexico’s southern states. Carrion-i-Silvestre and German-
Soto (2007) took a time series from 1940-2001 and found evidence of convergence after 
controlling for structural breaks. In a more recent study, Cabral and Mollick (2012), using 
dynamic panel data techniques, found positive rates of output convergence across Mexican 
regions: 9.4% for the period 1996 to 2006. 
All these studies analyzed periods of time prior to the Mexican Drug War, which was 
initiated in 2007. It is our conjecture that the speed of convergence might have changed for those 
Mexican states that were most affected by the policy outcomes (i.e. drastic increase in the 
homicide rate).  
 
Literature related to Drug Trafficking Organizations 
A difficulty when fighting DTOs is that the actions undertaken by governments often just shift 
the problem to another location. The spatial competition model developed by Rasmussen et al. 
(1993) suggests that higher drug enforcement in one jurisdiction simply moves the drug problem 
to neighboring jurisdictions, resulting in higher violent crime rates. Their analysis concludes that 
“Drug enforcement increases violent crime due to the disruption of spatial equilibria in drug 
markets” (Rasmussen et al. 1993, pp. 229-30).  
In countries facing insurgency movements, governments seek to fight the insurgents by 
military means and by providing services to incentivize the community to share information. 
Berman et al. (2011) examined the case of Iraq and found that regional spending on public goods 
is violence-reducing. However, Andreas (2004, p. 650) argues that “[m]ilitary success on the 





The economic literature on DTOs is scarce. Several scholars have opted to place the 
violent acts happening in Mexico in the same category as terrorist or counter-insurgency acts. As 
Williams (2012) explains, this characterization is wrong, since the killings in Mexico are not 
motivated by politics, ideology or religion and he stresses that while there is some evidence of 
‘careless’ violence (some civilians have been erroneously executed or caught in the crossfire), 
the violence in Mexico has been quite selective. 
The reasons for violence in Mexico are diverse. Variables such as the poverty rate, 
unemployment and weak institutions all play an important role. For example, Levitt and 
Venkatesh (2000) find that criminal organizations are more successful at recruiting people with 
lower incomes. In Mexico, where DTOs have been active for decades, the reasons for the rise in 
the homicide rate appear to be more closely associated with the increase in reprisal killings, the 
wars waged between rival DTOs and clashes with the armed forces. Rios (2013) claims that the 
violence is driven by two mechanisms: 1) the competition between DTOs to expand their drug 
trafficking turf, and 2) government action in the form of police and military operations to 
apprehend drug cartel members. These two mechanisms are obviously interconnected, since 
when the leaders of a dominant DTO are arrested, its competitors see an opportunity to expand 
into their territory, with a resulting escalation in violence. 
A recent study investigating violence and the effects of DTOs in Mexico (Dell 2015) 





involving a change in the ruling party.2 This result is in line with the findings of Snyder and 
Duran-Martinez (2009), Astorga and Shirk (2010) and Chabat (2010). A wave of violence 
following a change in the ruling party at the municipal level seems to indicate that the previous 
incumbent had entered into agreements with DTOs. Following the elections, these agreements 
are no longer binding and, as the police and military forces seek to capture the drug lords, 
violence breaks out. The Italian mafia display a similar pattern of behavior: “regions with a 
greater presence of criminal organizations are characterized by abnormal increases in homicides 
during the year before elections” (Alesina et al. 2016, p.2). 
 
Literature related to Economic Effects of Drug Violence  
Several studies have looked at economic variables and how the presence of organized crime 
affects them. For instance, Cabral et al. (2016) report that a rise in crime has negative effects on 
labor productivity. Ashby and Ramos (2013) find that organized crime in Mexico deters FDI in 
financial services, commerce and agriculture. For the housing market, the findings in Ajzenman 
et al. (2015) indicate that an increase of drug related homicides has negative effects on low-
quality housing prices. In terms of human capital accumulation, Marquez-Padilla et al. (2015) 
report barely any effect on total enrollment in schools. In their analysis of income inequality, 
Enamorado et al. (2016) estimate that a one-point increase in the Gini coefficient increases the 
number of drug-related homicides by 36%. Finally, Orozco-Aleman and Gonzalez-Lozano 
                                                 
2 Our analysis also included a test of political changes at the state level. Several dummy variables were used to test 
whether states governed by PRI or by PAN showed abnormal increases in their crime variables after state elections. 





(2017) study migration flows and find that migration decisions are sensitive to both local 
violence and transit (on route) violence. 
However, other studies conclude that the presence of DTOs could have various “positive” 
effects for the local economy. In their bid to expand their influence, DTOs need to infiltrate the 
social structure and attract members of the local community into the ranks that make up what is a 
labor-intensive drug production chain (Rios 2008). Having a DTO in town can lead to higher 
rates of employment and higher wages for those involved in production, transport and 
distribution. Fernández-Menéndez and Ronquillo (2006) report that farmers involved in 
marijuana and poppy production can earn wages that are several times higher than normal, in 
addition to receiving a generous lump-sum payment. Likewise, anecdotal evidence suggests that 
DTOs can have a positive economic impact: “The narcoeconomy ushered certain forms of 
consumption into an otherwise stagnant, marginal community; it brought money back into the 
community in various forms of legal reinvestment activities, such as farms and businesses; and it 
provided many people with all manner of jobs.” (McDonald 2005, p. 121). 
A further consequence of a town’s being under the influence of a DTO might be that 
corrupt government agents work for the benefit of the DTO, accepting bribes and sabotaging 
police operations. Meanwhile, these corrupt agents have to launder their bribe money without 
raising suspicions. Moreover, by focusing federal police or military operations within a specific 
state means that federal police forces and soldiers have to be relocated to that state, with the 
resulting additional expenditure for the government. 
To the best of our knowledge, the effects of the Mexican Drugs War on the country’s 
GDP and income growth have been examined primarily in three studies. First, Robles et al. 





unemployment using IV and Synthetic Control methods. They find that an increase of 10 
homicides per 100,000 habitants results in an increase of around 1.5% in the rate of 
unemployment, a 0.4% reduction in the proportion of business owners, and a 1.2% reduction in 
average income. In addition, they use a synthetic control to estimate that electricity consumed 
per capita fell in the first 2 years after a conflict involving two DTOs.  
 Second, Pan et al. (2012) use a spatial model to estimate the impact of violence on GDP 
between 2005 and 2009. They find that while GDP growth is positively related to crime within a 
specific state in the previous year, it is negatively related to crime in its surrounding states. An 
interesting aspect of this study is the introduction of an aggregate variable of federal grants 
(education, public security, health services, and social infrastructure). The model specification 
features homicides and an aggregate crime variable, which includes “homicide, fraud, rape, 
assault, damage to property, theft, and other crimes” (Pan et al. 2012, p. 55). While the 
homicides variable shows no significant results, this crime variable yields positive effects on 
growth, suggesting that more crime would result in a higher growth rate of the economy (which 
goes against our intuition). The positive sign reported in their study could be caused by an overly 
generic aggregation of crime variables (some crimes might not be related to DTOs). 
Third, Enamorado et al. (2014) employ the β-convergence framework to estimate the 
impact of drug-related homicides on real income growth in Mexico. They find evidence of a 
negative impact of drug-related homicides on income growth in Mexican municipalities between 
2005 and 2010. Their model considers aggregate figures of public expenditure at the local level, 
which are found to be significant. When comparing the effects of drug-related homicides with 





related homicide rate. The model recognizes some form of spatial interaction since it clusters the 
standard errors by state.  
These last two studies are particularly relevant to the case we deal with here as both 
approaches seek to link their empirical models to the growth literature in a similar way to the 
method we adopt here. However, our analysis differs from these two studies in various ways. We 
seek to undertake a more comprehensive analysis of the Drug War in Mexico than previous 
studies by including an approximation of military expenditure instead of using federal grants 
(Pan et al. 2012) and municipal government expenditure (Enamorado et al. 2014). Figure 1 
presents both grant expenditures destined for public security as a share of total grant 
expenditures and public security expenditures (i.e., local police) as a share of total municipal 
expenditures. Both public expenditure measures show that only an average of 1.4% of grant 
money and 3.9% of municipal expenditure are destined specifically to public security. These 
percentages suggest that the expenditure figures used by Pan et al. (2012) and Enamorado et al. 
(2014) are not earmarked to fight DTOs, while a key feature of our study is that we explicitly 
model the Mexican government’s policy to fight DTOs by including military expenditure.  
(Insert FIGURE 1 around here) 
Other differences concern choices regarding the empirical methodology and data 
employed. Enamorado et al. (2014) opt for ordinary least squares and two-stage least squares in 
conducting their cross-sectional analysis, whereas Pan et al. (2012) use a spatial model with 
panel data. Neither of these models is dynamic. Here, by employing a difference-generalized 
method of moments (GMM) model, we take into account the dynamic nature of the data, and 
control for autocorrelation. This model is also well suited to deal with potential endogeneity 





which only analyze the initial stages of the spike in violence. By considering data from 2003 to 
2013, we cover all of Calderón’s presidency (and several years before).  
In the absence of the policy implemented by Calderón’s administration, it is likely that 
the homicide rate, in common with other crime indicators, would have followed the downward 
trend and eventually abated. However, the violence of this period was generated by a) the 
confrontation between government officials and DTO members; b) the struggles that broke out 
between DTO lieutenants as they fought to take power following the death of a DTO leader; and 
c) the expansion of turf boundaries by a DTO and the ensuing struggle for power with a 
competing DTO.  
To enhance the measurement of crime indicators related to DTOs, we gave individual 
consideration to a range of high-impact crime variables. Indeed, these were the variables used by 
the government to assess progress during the Drug War. Government expenditure on the fight 
against crime is central to our model, since we wish to identify the effect of this spending on the 
state economy. Therefore, we concentrate on an approximation of state-level military budgets.  
 
3. The Policy 
During the last decade of the 20th century, the number of DTOs increased as a result of cartel 
fragmentation, an increase in political competition, and anti-corruption reforms (Snyder and 
Duran-Martinez 2009, p. 270). The growth of DTOs across the country weakened the 
government’s position, even had they wanted to strike a new deal with the drug lords.  
Towards the end of Fox’s administration (2001-2006), DTO-related homicides rose 
significantly, from 9,329 in 2004 to 10,452 in 2006. Unsurprisingly, one of the main pillars of 





would have represented too high a political cost (Chabat 2010). In December 2006, Calderón 
launched the 2007-2012 Directive for the Integral Fight against Drug Trafficking (Directiva para 
el Combate Integral al Narcotráfico 2007-2012).  
While the Mexican military had played some role in fighting the DTOs for some time, the 
Directive introduced new and more aggressive guidelines against drug trafficking. It identified 
four strategies to support its national security policy: 1) Improve operation schemes to eradicate 
local cultivations, intercept illegal drug trafficking, and fight DTOs; 2) Contribute to activities 
organized by public security institutions to guarantee a safe social environment; 3) Help maintain 
the rule of law by fighting armed criminal organizations; 4) Strengthen army and air force 
capacities to enforce laws against firearms and explosives. This fourth point aimed at identifying 
and stopping the illegal firearm flows coming from the United States. 
With the new Directive, “[t]he federal government […] deployed thousands of federal 
troops to man checkpoints, establish street patrols, and oversee other domestic law enforcement 
functions in high drug violence states” (Shirk 2012, p. 10). In addition, the military inspected 
hangars, deposits, mail delivery companies, and bus and train stations. The military also 
cooperated with police forces to stop criminals. As Dell (2015) explains, “Drug seizures and 
high-level arrests are typically made by the federal police and military, who have the requisite 
training and weaponry to fight heavily armed traffickers” (p.1746). During Calderón’s 
administration, the Defense Department reported the detention of 9 high-ranking drug lords and 
149 cartel lieutenants (Defense Department’s activities reports, 2007-2012).3 
                                                 
3 The fight against the drug cartels was not conducted by army forces alone. In fact, Calderón deployed the army, 





Military operations are costly, and indeed the government increased the Defense 
Department’s budget over real GDP from 0.24% in 2006 to 0.47% by 2012. If we consider total 
military expenditure as a percentage of GDP, then it rose from 0.4 to 0.6% between 2006 and 
2012, according to World Bank data. Similarly, expenditure increased in all Mexico’s military 
regions, but regions III, IV, V and VI (where the Drug War waged was particularly intense) 
recorded larger increases in several years, and an increase well above the average for the period 
(see Figure A1 in the Appendix). In addition, the budget increases for each military region 
during the period 2003-2013 is also included in Figures A2a and A2b in the Appendix. 
Calderón’s determination to fight the drug cartels won the support of the U.S. 
government. On 30 June 2008, the Merida Initiative was passed by the U.S. congress. As a result 
of this initiative, the U.S. government offered to support the Mexican government with a three-
year, $1.4 billion U.S. Dollar aid package to be used for judicial reform, institution-building, 
human rights and rule-of-law issues (Shirk 2010). In addition, the Mexican military acquired 
helicopters and surveillance aircrafts. Despite Calderón’s policy (or, perhaps, because of it), the 
number of homicides in the country rose markedly during the administration. In fact, all criminal 
activities related to DTOs experienced a significant increase: drug trafficking, homicides, 
kidnappings, the armed robbery of vehicles, etc. 
Figure 2 shows the evolution in military spending and the homicide rate per 100,000 
habitants, while Figure 3 displays the evolution of all crimes and the evolution of crimes that are 
                                                 
Wallman, 2015). The role played by the navy is particularly interesting; according to Camp (2010), the navy tends to 
be more transparent than the army, and more willing to cooperate internationally. If we compare the respective 





associated with DTOs. The correlation between all crimes and DTO crimes is 0.872 for the 
period 2003 to 2013 and 0.826 for the period 2007-2013.  
(Insert FIGURE 2 around here) 
(Insert FIGURE 3 around here) 
Furthermore, Figure 4 shows that different crimes increased substantially during the 
period 2006-2012. The largest increases were recorded in extortion (113%), kidnapping (79%), 
homicides (70%), and aggravated robbery (41%). Although a few of these crimes do not follow 
the same pattern as the other crimes, it is possible that particularly those crimes are undercounted 
or unreported by authorities. 
(Insert FIGURE 4 around here) 
4. Empirical Strategy 
We use a simple Cobb-Douglas production function, in line with that proposed in Mankiw et al. 
(1992), and adapt it to the regional β-convergence hypothesis, as discussed in Barro et al. (1991). 
β-convergence refers to the negative relationship between the rate of growth of a particular 
variable (here GDP per capita) and the initial level of that variable. Furthermore, we model 
violence and the efforts to fight this violence by introducing a deterrent variable. The 
development of the theoretical model is presented in Appendix A and B. For our empirical 
strategy, we introduce the following econometric specification of the dynamic panel data model 
used herein: 
𝑦 𝛼 1 𝛽 𝑦 𝛽 𝑘 𝛽 ℎ 𝛽 𝑛 𝛿 𝐹𝑖𝑛. 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠  






where 𝑦  is the logarithm of real state GDP in per capita terms, 𝛼 is the intercept, 𝑦  is the 
logarithm of initial state GDP per capita and 𝛽 1 𝑒 , which informs us about the 
speed of convergence. This becomes evident if we transform equation (1) into first differences, 
as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), to eliminate state-specific effects: 
𝑦 𝑦  𝛼 1 𝑒 𝑦 𝛽 ∆𝑘 𝛽 ∆ℎ 𝛽 ∆𝑛  
𝛿 ∆𝐹𝑖𝑛. 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝛿 ∆𝐻𝑅 𝛿 ∆𝑀𝐵 ∆𝜀  
(2) 
In this specification, real state GDP is expressed in per capita terms. In addition to fitting 
the theoretical model, the per capita adjustment of real GDP helps to control for population size 
and migration. This variable selection is in line with that employed in similar studies, including 
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), Bilgel and Karahasan (2015) and Pinotti (2014). 
Furthermore, 𝑘  and ℎ  are the variables that approximate physical and human capital 
(in logarithms), respectively, and 𝑛  is the population growth rate. We also introduce a dummy 
for the 2008-2009 financial crisis, the logarithm of the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants 
(𝐻𝑅 ), and the logarithm of the approximation of state military spending (army only) in per 
capita terms (𝑀𝐵 ). Finally, 𝜀  is a stochastic error term. 
To ensure that our model is correctly specified, we ran several diagnostic tests to check 
that no important assumptions of our spatial model are violated. With variance inflection factors 
between 1.02 and 1.19 for all variables, we can rule out the presence of multicollinearity. To 
control for heteroscedasticity, we used robust standard errors. Furthermore, we included a one-
period time lag of the dependent variable to account for the time autocorrelation. 
Overall, we expect positive signs for the lagged absolute value of real GDP per capita, 
physical capital and human capital, whereas the 2008-2009 financial crisis should have a 





other crimes related to DTOs, to negatively affect the economy. In the case of the government’s 
military expenditure variable in the form of army spending, we expect a positive sign, given that 
the Drug War does not destroy physical assets and that government spending enters the GDP 
equation positively from the demand side. 
  
5. Data 
For our estimations, we draw on balanced panel data for all 32 Mexican states (the Distrito 
Federal, the capital, is considered a contiguous state) for the period 2003-2013. The state-level is 
the smallest spatial unit for which all the variables considered here were available. During this 
period, a political change took place at the presidential level. With this, an important shift was 
recorded in homeland security policy. This period also coincides with the 2007-2012 Directive 
for the Integral Fight against Drug Trafficking, or ‘Drug War’.  
We obtained population data for each state from the National Population Council 
(CONAPO), the institution responsible for overseeing the national census. The last census was 
conducted in 2015 and the yearly population data reported for each state considers national and 
international migration. These population data are used to compute per capita figures and 
violence rates. The time series for real state GDP by state were obtained from INEGI. Figure A3 
in the Appendix shows cross-sectional maps of GDP per capita growth from 2004-2013.  
In the absence of official capital stock data, we use the figures presented in German-Soto 
(2015), which are a computation of the capital stock data described in German-Soto (2008). Data 
for human capital are also scarce. The regional science literature circumvents this problem by 





available for the whole period. Therefore, we opted to use state averages of years of schooling 
instead.  
Both INEGI and the Interior Department publish homicide statistics. INEGI uses 
administrative registers from the National Health Information System (SINAIS), which follow 
the classification recommended by the WHO, whereas the Interior Department compiles its data 
from police investigation files. Although INEGI is unable to identify a homicide as being related 
to a drug crime, we opted for this source for several reasons. First, INEGI is a more trustworthy 
source than the Interior Ministry due to its autonomy (working as it does independently of any 
law-enforcement agency). Second, there have been newspaper reports about police forces failing 
to investigate murders in some northern states due to the great volume of homicides. According 
to Shirk and Wallman (2015), less than 25 percent of crimes are reported, and only 20 percent of 
these are investigated. And, third, it has been suggested that the government might manipulate 
data to improve its approval ratings and to support its security strategy. We obtained other crime 
data (kidnapping, extortion, car robbery, aggravated robbery, property crimes and fraud) from 
Mexico’s Technical Secretary for the National Security Council (SESNSP), which is part of the 
Interior Department. The SESNSP gathers crime statistics from the each state attorney’s office, 
and it is, to the best of our knowledge, the best available source for crime data in Mexico.  
Information about military and navy budgets is not publicly available at the state level. 
We undertook searches of government records and budgets but were unable to find state budgets 
for either military or navy spending. We followed this up with a formal information request, but 
were informed that this information was only available at the regional level. We managed to 
obtain regional military budgets for the 12 regions that are made available in the Federation’s 





subdivision into regions was only available for the military, but not for the navy or federal 
police. For that reason, we focus on the military budget only. 
The budget contains information on a wide range of subjects including the funding 
destined to each of the 12 military regions. Each region can comprise up to five states. Figure 5 
describes which states make up each military region. 
(Insert FIGURE 5 around here) 
Due to the lack of data on military budgets by state, we approximate them by allocating 
the regional budget based on variables that are good indicators of military involvement in the 
‘Drug War’. First, we summed up the total number of people detained during operations 
targeting DTO activities and then we calculated the percentage corresponding to each state 
belonging to same military region. Using these percentages, we assigned the proportional share 
of the military budget to each state. Moreover, when conducting the robustness checks, we also 
considered the number of vehicles seized either in operations targeting drug criminals or when 
conducting searches at specific check-points, and the number of investigation files opened.  
Dell (2015) reported that local governments with representatives from the National 
Action Party (PAN) are more likely to ask for help from the federal government (also PAN at the 
time). Based on this, we consider a fourth allocation option and allocate regional military budget 
based on the number of PAN voters at the last governor election.  
Using these variables only (and not crime variables) to allocate military budgets adheres 
to the intuition that military budgets are assigned to those areas (states) where government 
activity to apprehend DTOs is most intense. Most military regions comprise either two or three 
states, which means the error associated with the allocation of the budget is limited. Dividing a 





The variables selected for the allocation of the regional military budgets during the period 
considered are well suited because: a) they show temporal and spatial variation, and b) they are 
closely related to the Drug War strategy initiated by Calderón. For example, if a region 
comprises two states, one in which DTOs are highly active and one with little DTO activity, we 
can expect a higher share of the budget during the Drug War to be allocated to the state in which 
DTOs are more active. All these variables are reported by INEGI in its Anuario Estadístico y 
Geográfico por Entidad Federativa and are computed specifically for the ‘Drug War’. However, 
they do not refer solely to the actions taken by the military, and include also the efforts of the 
navy as well as those of the federal and local police. To show some of the characteristics of the 
variables used for the allocation of military budgets, we report their descriptive statistics in Table 
A1 in the Appendix. 
Table 1 describes the variables used in our econometric specification of the model. Table 
2 presents the descriptive statistics for these variables. The rates of kidnapping, extortion, 
property crimes and fraud include fewer observations because some states did not report 
occurrences in some years. 
(Insert TABLE 1 around here) 
(Insert TABLE 2 around here) 
 
6. Results 
The results of our policy analysis of the ‘Mexican Drug War’ are reported in Table 3. Here, 
various econometric specifications are presented: first, to generate some intuition about the 
variables, we introduce a restricted version of the model using a fixed effects estimation 





capital variables are unavailable. Then, we refine the accuracy of our estimates by introducing 
physical and human capital stocks (columns 2-4). In column 2, we introduce the homicide rate 
provided by INEGI as a proxy for violence and in column 3, we use the military budget allocated 
by the number of detained people. Column 4 includes both these variables.  
(Insert TABLE 3 around here) 
As mentioned, equations 1-4 are estimated with fixed effects so as to generate some 
intuition. However, fixed effects regressions are biased because they do not account for the 
dynamic nature of the model. Neglecting to do so leads to consistency issues as described in 
detail by Nickell (1981). To overcome this, we use the difference-GMM panel data specification 
developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) in columns 5-8. This method takes into account the 
dynamic nature of the lagged dependent variable, by differentiating with one-period lagged 
values correcting for the bias. Because of this, the estimation reports 288 observations instead of 
320. 
From the performance statistics provided at the bottom of Table 3, we can see that the 
GMM estimations fit the model well because the Chi2-statistic of the Wald test strongly rejects 
(at the 1% level) the null hypothesis of the joint statistical insignificance of the covariates. Due 
to the inclusion of the lagged value of the dependent variable as a covariate (which is highly 
significant in the fixed effects estimations), first-order serial correlation in the first-differenced 
errors is expected. We then reject the existence of second-order serial correlation in the first- 
differenced errors. With these results for the different tests we can affirm that our model is 





Difference-GMM panel data estimations rely on a series of lagged variables that are then 
differenced and used as instruments4. The Hansen test checks that the over-identifying 
restrictions are valid. The inclusion of all possible instruments in a small sample size would 
result in too many over-identifying restrictions and consequently the specification would perform 
poorly. To overcome this, and following Roodman (2009a), we restrict the number of 
instruments in each equation so that the null hypothesis of Hansen’s over-identification test 
(instruments are valid) cannot be rejected. 
In all our estimations, we use the same dependent variable: i.e. the logarithm of real state 
GDP per capita. The logarithm of the lagged value of GDP per capita (interpreted as the initial 
level) is positive and highly significant for all specifications. Bearing in mind that 𝛽 1
𝑒 , the results are intuitive and in line with economic theory. Richer economies tend to have 
lower GDP growth rates while poorer economies tend to have higher rates.  
The variable for the per capita physical capital stock performs well, being positive and 
highly significant. For the human capital variable proxied by average schooling years, the 
coefficient is positive but in some cases not significant. Such results for human capital,  non-
significant and even sometimes negative, are found in other studies that undertake panel data 
analyses in an augmented Solow Model framework (Benhabib and Spiegel 1994; Islam 1995). 
This aspect is often attributed to a lack of variability in the education averages once jurisdiction-
specific heterogeneity (state-specific fixed effects) is accounted for. 
                                                 
4 As suggested in Roodman (2009b), all regressors are included into the instrument matrix. The dependent variable, 
physical capital, human capital, the military budget and the different crime rates are all treated as endogenous, while 





The 2008-2009 financial crisis had a marked impact on Mexican states. As expected, the 
estimates are negative and highly significant for all specifications. The descriptive map (Figure 
A3 in the Appendix) shows that in 2008 signs of the crisis began to emerge, but it was not until 
2009 that all 32 states reported negative growth rates in their per capita output. Hence, the 
magnitude and the negative sign of the coefficient of this two-year dummy seems reasonable.  
In the approach reported here, we measure growth in the homicide rate, i.e., we focus on 
the flow but not on the stock of homicides. We obtain negative and highly significant 
coefficients. A negative sign is clearly intuitive if we consider the wave of violence affecting 
Mexico to be a deterrent to the states’ economic performance. Thus, not only do drug-related 
homicides seem to affect state economic growth, but the increase in violence in terms of 
homicides seems to have negative and highly significant marginal effects. 
Our results for this DTO-associated crime variable are in line with results in Enamorado 
et al. (2014) for the drug-related homicide rate (measured in levels). The coefficients indicate a 
negative association with state GDP per capita. In Pan et al. (2012), the aggregate crime variable 
has a positive and significant sign, resulting from the fact that their variable is an aggregation of 
crimes which may have opposite signs.   
Here, the military budget allocated based on the number of detained people in each state 
is positive and highly significant for the full model specification reported in column 8. In 
keeping with our claim that the approximated military budget should be a good indicator of 
where the Drug War strategy was implemented most intensely, this positive association indicates 
that military spending had a positive effect on state GDP per capita growth. 
To address potential issues of reverse causation, we check for the possibility that states 





the correlations of our variables (Table A2 in the Appendix) and the auxiliary difference-GMM 
regression between the growth rate of state GDP per capita and the military budget options. From 
this analysis, we find that the correlations are minimal while the regression indicates no 
significant effects. The results of this auxiliary regression can be found in Table A3 in the 
Appendix.  
Allocation Alternatives for Military Expenditure 
Military expenditure is our main variable of interest. For this reason, we consider it both 
pertinent and necessary to show that the budget is robust to different ways of allocating it. Thus, 
we tested additional allocation variables associated with the fight waged by the Mexican military 
against DTOs.  
In the category of crimes catalogued as crimes against society, the number of detentions 
is specifically related to “crimes against health”, including such crimes as drug trafficking, 
terrorist acts, human organ trafficking and trafficking of other illegal products. In addition to  the 
number of people detained during such crimes, INEGI also reports and the number of vehicles 
seized. Moreover, it is evident that most criminal investigations (per capita) are conducted in 
those states that are being disputed by DTOs. We chose investigations because it is often the case 
that the authorities initiate inquiries into shootings between DTOs or they find mass graves in a 
DTO territory. The results in Table 4 show that the estimates for military expenditure are 
positive5, highly significant, and range from 0.0082 to 0.0202. Recall that caution is needed 
                                                 
5 Our results for military expenditures present a positive sign that is different from the local expenditure variables 
reported by Enamorado et al. (2014) and Pan et al. (2012). However, a direct comparison cannot be made because in 





when interpreting the magnitude of this variable, because it is a state approximation for data that 
are available only at regional level.  
(Insert TABLE 4 around here) 
The war waged against DTOs is unlike any other. While typical wars target strategic 
physical assets such as transport, energy and communication infrastructure, a drug war is waged 
differently. Ongoing military operations to fight drug criminals bring with them the need for 
increased government spending, especially to sponsor field operations conducted by military 
troops (mainly infantry). Thus, rather than facing the widespread destruction of physical assets, 
the drug war results in increased government expenditure. The extraordinarily high level of 
military spending by Mexican standards is positively associated with the growth rate of real state 
per capita GDP.6 Mexico presents an annual average increase of 8.33% between 2006 and 2012 
in its real military expenditure, which is much higher than that recorded in the other major 
countries (population > 20M) of Latin America: Brazil (5.24%), Colombia (4.92%), Argentina 
(2.10%), Peru (5.87%) and Venezuela (6.31%) [Data taken from Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI)].   
 
                                                 
security, in general, nor the fight against DTOs, in particular. Moreover, public expenditures in these studies are 
determined at the local level, while military expenditure is determined at federal level.  
6   It is logical to believe that the drug lords will have increased their expenditure on arms, vehicles, personnel 
(sicarios), and other means to fight increasing government action, thus boosting demand in a state’s economy. 





Robustness of Violence 
To show the robustness of our estimates for the violence variable, we present the estimation 
results obtained when using alternative proxies for crime and violence. These include rates of 
kidnapping, extortion, car robbery, aggravated robbery, property crimes and fraud. These 
criminal activities are often associated with the diversification of DTOs (Rios 2008; Shirk 2012; 
Calderón et al. 2015). The results are presented in Table 5.  
(Insert TABLE 5 around here) 
Comparing the estimates of the violence proxies, we see that all coefficients present a 
similar magnitude, between -0.00745 and -0.0177, and are highly significant. In other words, a 
100% increase of the different crime rates would result in a 0.7-1.7 percentage point decrease of 
per capita state GDP. The results also show that property crimes, aggravated robbery and 
homicides have the largest negative effects among the crimes considered here.  
Enamorado et al. (2014) calculate that an increase by one standard deviation in the 
number of drug-related homicides (18 homicides) implies a decrease in growth of 0.20 
percentage points. According to our estimates, a one standard deviation increase in the rate of 
(intentional) homicides per 100,000 inhabitants represents a decrease of 1.21 percentage points 
in growth. One aspect that might explain this difference is that Enamorado et al. (2014) employ 
the rate of homicides in 2007 only, which happens to be the same year in which the national 
homicide rate reached a low point. Hence, our results suggest that the homicide effects reported 
in Enamorado et al. (2014) would be underestimated. 
The results obtained by Pan et al. (2012) show no significant effects associated with 
homicides. The study also employs an aggregation of crimes for which the authors find positive 





additional estimation using crimes not likely to be associated with DTO, e.g. the non-violent 
theft rate and the manslaughter rate, and find positive but non-significant results7. These non-
significant estimates could give some intuition as to why Pan et al. (2012) find positive results 
for their aggregated crime variable. 
 
Spatial Effects 
Although most actions undertaken by the states to fight DTOs (i.e. operations conducted by local 
and state police) are limited by individual state jurisdictions, military action and drug trafficking 
activities are not. For this reason, we study the existence of spatial effects in neighboring states. 
Table A4 in the Appendix shows the results of the estimation output for the spatial model. The 
signs of the coefficients are consistent with those obtained in the difference-GMM model 
described above. Likewise, the coefficients of the approximated state military spending are 
positive and in all cases highly significant. Thus, our military budget approximation is robust to 
the inclusion of a spatial component. Finally, all the crime variables used here are negative and 
remain significant.8 
 
                                                 
7 Results are available upon request. 
8 The coefficient for the spatial variable (the W-matrix multiplied by the spatially lagged value of state GDP p.c. 
included in the model) is positive and significant. We perform a standard test to ensure that the spatial coefficient is 
different from zero. Based on the significance of the values reported in the table, we reject the hypothesis of the 






This paper has analyzed the Mexican government’s policy in its fight against DTOs. Moreover, it 
has studied the effects of this policy on state GDP per capita using a panel data GMM model 
developed within the theoretical framework of regional convergence.  
We focus our attention on the effects of the policy implemented by the government to 
fight DTOs as approximated by state-level military spending. As only regional military budgets 
are available, we propose a state-level approximation of the military budget. We detect two 
different effects of the ‘Drug War’ policy on economic growth: on the one hand, the escalation in 
violence since the adoption of the ‘Drug War’ strategy has resulted in significant negative effects 
on economic growth, regardless of the crime variable employed; on the other hand, military 
expenditure at state level presents a positive and significant effect on state economic growth. Our 
results indicate that an increase of 100 percentage points in the military budget (allocated using 
the number of people detained) is associated with an increase of 0.82 to 2.02 points in the state 
GDP per capita growth rate. 
DTOs constitute a serious problem for Mexico, and for other countries on the continent. 
However, the war waged against these criminal organizations is having several unintended and 
unforeseen consequences, with particular effects on economic activity. While we have analyzed 
some of these effects during president Calderón’s administration, much more research is needed 
if we are to gain a better understanding of the problem and of how to address it. To conduct this 
research, the Mexican authorities need to make more and better data available to researchers, so 
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Log of Physical Capital Stock of physical capital per capita by State (in 
logarithms) 
+ Germán-Soto 
(2015) / CONAPO 
Log of Human Capital Average years of schooling of the general population 
aged 15 and more per State (in logarithms) 
+ INEGI 
Population Growth Rate Population growth rate in % – CONAPO 
Financial Crisis Binary variable: 1 for the years 2008-2009; 0 
otherwise 
– - 
Log of Homicide Rate Homicides rate per 100,000 habitants (in logarithms) – INEGI / SINAIS 
Log of Kidnapping Rate Kidnapping rate per 100,000 habitants (in logarithms) – SESNSP 
Log of Extortion Rate Extortion rate per 100,000 habitants (in logarithms) – SESNSP 
Log of Car Robbery Car Robbery rate with and without violence per 
100,000 habitants (in logarithms) 
– SESNSP 
Log of Aggravated Robbery Aggravated robbery rate per 100,000 habitants (in 
logarithms) 
– SESNSP 
Log of Property Crimes Property Crimes rate per 100,000 habitants (in 
logarithms) 
– SESNSP 
Log of Fraud Fraud rate per 100,000 habitants (in logarithms) – SESNSP 
Log of MB (Detained 
People 
Logarithm of the allocated Military budget per capita 
for each State (in $MXN of 2008) based on the number 
of detained people during drug war operations in each 
state 





Log of MB (Seized 
Vehicles) 
Logarithm of the allocated Military budget per capita 
for each State (in $MXN of 2008) based on the number 
of seized vehicles during drug war operations 
+ PEF / INEGI 
Log of MB (Investigations) Logarithm of the allocated Military budget per capita 
for each State (in $MXN of 2008) based on the number 
of investigations opened in each state 
+ PEF / INEGI 
Log of MB (PAN Voters) Logarithm of the allocated Military budget per capita 
for each State (in $MXN of 2008) based on the number 
of PAN voters during the last governor election 











Min. Max. Obs. 
Log of GDP p.c. 11.4737 0.5723 10.5101 13.9922 320 
Log of Physical Capital -2.9863 0.8156 -4.6369 -0.6614 320 
Log of Human Capital 2.1253 0.1110 1.7846 2.3780 320 
Population Growth Rate 0.0145 0.0072 -0.0020 0.0388 320 
Financial Crisis 0.2000 0.4006 0.0000 1.0000 320 
Log of Homicide Rate 2.3315 0.8578 0.5403 5.2048 320 
Log of Kidnapping Rate -0.6922 1.1867 -3.9120 3.6014 284 
Log of Extortion Rate 1.2401 1.0675 -2.9957 3.5888 263 
Log of Car Robbery 4.4647 1.0642 0.7696 7.0108 320 
Log of Aggravated Robbery 4.4099 1.0635 0.0091 7.1547 320 
Log of Property Crimes 5.2891 0.7036 2.4360 6.5503 319 
Log of Fraud 3.8444 0.8208 -1.4819 5.021314 318 
Log of MB (Detained People) 19.6575 1.2211 15.8109 23.3908 320 
Log of MB (Seized Vehicles) 19.7143 1.2000 16.1260 23.1624 320 
Log of MB (Investigations) 19.6900 1.1514 17.1934 23.4032 320 







Table 3: Estimation Results of the Fixed Effects and Difference GMM Models 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dep. Variable:  

















Log of State GDP p.c. (t-1) 0.814*** 0.616*** 0.615*** 0.613*** 0.633*** 0.361*** 0.373*** 0.347*** 
 (0.0317) (0.0357) (0.0357) (0.0357) (0.109) (0.0221) (0.0403) (0.0352) 
Log of Physical Capital  0.215*** 0.211*** 0.212***  0.540*** 0.550*** 0.489*** 
  (0.0229) (0.0230) (0.0230)  (0.0207) (0.0394) (0.0259) 
Log of Human Capital  0.136** 0.0614 0.0945  0.251*** 0.122** 0.0832 
  (0.0616) (0.0666) (0.0721)  (0.0276) (0.0604) (0.0753) 
Population Growth Rate 2.189* 1.131 1.134 0.896 -2.853 0.508 -1.885 -1.178 
 (1.133) (0.968) (0.970) (0.990) (6.478) (0.478) (1.212) (1.076) 
Financial Crisis -0.0505*** -0.0375*** -0.0379*** -0.0373*** -0.0742*** -0.0201*** -0.0179*** -0.0191*** 
 (0.00458) (0.00426) (0.00423) (0.00426) (0.0161) (0.00194) (0.00293) (0.00170) 
Log of Homicide Rate -0.00436 -0.00361  -0.00475 0.0301*** -0.0037***  -0.0141*** 
 (0.00426) (0.00387)  (0.00400) (0.00761) (0.00102)  (0.00253) 
Log of MB (Detained People) 0.00491*  0.00244 0.00334 -0.0265***  0.0209*** 0.0202*** 
  (0.00297)   (0.00292) (0.00301) (0.00973)   (0.00475) (0.00272) 
Observations 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 
Number of States 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
R-squared 0.785 0.840 0.840 0.841     
F-Test 183.5 218.3 218.1 187.4     
Number of Instruments     16 33 27 36 
Chi2 of the Wald Test     340.6*** 106,178*** 7,561*** 18,219*** 
AR(1) -2.302** -2.717*** -2.479** -2.785*** 
AR(2) 0.0601 -0.803 -0.482 -0.410 
Hansen Test p-value         0.384 0.474 0.199 0.525 
Note: Dependent variable: Log of State GDP per capita. Constant term not included in the table. MB is the military budget 







Table 4: Estimation Results Using Different Variables to Allocate Military Expenditure 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Variable:  









Log of State GDP p.c. (t-1) 0.347*** 0.391*** 0.371*** 0.386*** 
 (0.0352) (0.0227) (0.0280) (0.0183) 
Log of Physical Capital 0.489*** 0.488*** 0.482*** 0.486*** 
 (0.0259) (0.0234) (0.0166) (0.0219) 
Log of Human Capital 0.0832 0.0604 0.0864* 0.100** 
 (0.0753) (0.0734) (0.0457) (0.0490) 
Population Growth Rate -1.178 -1.385 1.833** 0.767 
 (1.076) (1.281) (0.733) (0.656) 
Financial Crisis -0.0191*** -0.0212*** -0.0246*** -0.0226*** 
 (0.00170) (0.00198) (0.00223) (0.00229) 
Log of Homicide Rate -0.0141*** -0.00851*** -0.00550*** -0.00424*** 
 (0.00253) (0.00255) (0.00196) (0.00123) 
Log of MB (Detained People) 0.0202***    
 (0.00272)    
Log of MB (Seized Vehicles)  0.0183***   
  (0.00313)   
Log of MB (Investigations)   0.0168***  
   (0.00285)  
Log of MB (PAN Voters)    0.00818*** 
        (0.00238) 
Observations 288 288 288 288 
Number of States 32 32 32 32 
Number of Instruments 36 36 36 36 
AR(1) -2.785*** -2.862*** -3.055*** -3.173*** 
AR(2) -0.410 -0.589 -0.522 -0.504 
Chi2 of the Wald Test 18,219*** 12,572*** 84,799*** 156,583*** 
Hansen Test p-value 0.525 0.542 0.516 0.531 
Note: Dependent variable: Log of State GDP per capita. Constant term not included in the table. MB 
stands for the military budget allocated according to the indicator in parentheses. Robust standard 







Table 5: Estimation Results Using Alternative Crime Rates in Mexican States 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dep. Variable:  















Log of State GDP p.c. (t-1) 0.347*** 0.205*** 0.367*** 0.345*** 0.400*** 0.362*** 0.279*** 
 
(0.0352) (0.0263) (0.0309) (0.0382) (0.0227) (0.0261) (0.0207) 
Log of Physical Capital 0.489*** 0.619*** 0.552*** 0.499*** 0.449*** 0.527*** 0.584*** 
 
(0.0259) (0.0237) (0.0249) (0.0308) (0.0153) (0.0247) (0.0229) 
Log of Human Capital 0.0832 0.267*** 0.0360 0.119** 0.0974* -0.0223 -0.0117 
 
(0.0753) (0.0633) (0.0862) (0.0530) (0.0571) (0.0354) (0.0573) 
Population Growth Rate -1.178 1.357** 0.799 0.668 2.340*** -1.146 -3.216*** 
 
(1.076) (0.687) (1.753) (0.592) (0.759) (1.032) (0.970) 
Financial Crisis -0.0191*** -0.0119*** -0.0237*** -0.0209*** -0.0292*** -0.0188*** -0.0129*** 
 
(0.00170) (0.00197) (0.00243) (0.00244) (0.00132) (0.00314) (0.00238) 
Log of MB (Detained People) 0.0202*** 0.0165*** 0.0158*** 0.0131*** 0.0170*** 0.0122*** 0.0178*** 
 
(0.00272) (0.00293) (0.00548) (0.00272) (0.00325) (0.00270) (0.00396) 
Log of Homicide Rate -0.0141*** 
      
 
(0.00253) 
      
Log of Kidnapping Rate 
 
-0.00823*** 
     
  
(0.000642) 
     
Log of Extortion Rate 
  
-0.00745** 
    
   
(0.00347) 
    
Log of Car Robbery Rate 
   
-0.0109*** 
   
    
(0.00212) 
   
Log of Aggravated Robbery Rate 
    
-0.0148*** 
  
     
(0.00362) 
  
Log of Property Crime Rate 







      
(0.00218) 
 
Log of Fraud Rate 
      
-0.00846*** 
       
(0.00127) 
Observations 288 241 230 288 288 286 284 
Number of States 32 31 31 32 32 32 32 
Number of Instruments 36 33 33 36 36 36 33 
Chi2 of the Wald Test 18,219*** 8,126*** 41,252*** 26,849*** 3,320*** 58,567*** 5,759*** 
AR(1) -2.785*** -1.603 -1.842* -3.248*** -3.352*** -2.744*** -2.053** 
AR(2) -0.410 -1.056 0.308 -0.252 0.654 -0.678 -0.991 
Hansen Test p-value 0.525 0.616 0.377 0.488 0.394 0.618 0.408 
Note: Dependent variable: Log of State GDP per capita. MB is the military budget allocated by the rate of detained people. 








Figure 1: Public Security Expenditure Shares in Mexico, 2003-2013 
Figure 2: Evolution of Real Military Spending and Homicides per 100,000 Inhabitants, 2000-
2013 
Figure 3: Quarterly Evolution of All Crimes and Crimes Associated with Drug Trafficking 
Organizations, 2003-2013 
Figure 4: Crime Variables Associated with Drug Trafficking Organizations per 100,000 
Inhabitants, 1999-2013 
Figure 5: Mexican Military Regions 
 
Appendix Figure Captions 
Figure A1: Cumulated Growth Rate of the Real Military Budget for All Military Regions for the 
Period 2006-2012 
Figure A2a: Growth Rate of the Real Military Budget in Military Regions One to Six, 2003-2013 
Figure A2b: Growth Rate of the Real Military Budget in Military Regions Seven to Twelve, 
2003-2013 













Source: Panel a): based on data from INEGI; Panel b): based on data from the Secretariat of 



















Note: The crimes associated to DTOs are: homicides, kidnapping for ransom, aggravated robbery, 
















Note: The Mexican Military Regions comprise the following federal states:   
 Military Region I:  Distrito Federal; Hidalgo; State of Mexico; Morelos   
 Military Region II:  Baja California; Baja California Sur; Sonora    
 Military Region III:  Sinaloa; Durango       
 Military Region IV:  Nuevo León; San Luis Potosí; Tamaulipas    
 Military Region V:  Aguascalientes; Colima; Jalisco; Nayarit; Zacatecas   
 Military Region VI:  Puebla; Tlaxcala; Veracruz      
 Military Region VII:  Chiapas; Tabasco       
 Military Region VIII:  Oaxaca        
 Military Region IX:  Guerrero        
 Military Region X:  Campeche; Quintana Roo; Yucatán     
 Military Region XI:  Chihuahua; Coahuila 







Appendix 1. Theoretical Framework  
We work with a regional economy growth model, where in region 𝑖 during time 𝑡 the 
economy uses labor (𝐿 ), physical (𝐾 ) and human (𝐻 ) capital stocks, as well as the state of 
technology (𝐴 ) to produce its output (𝑌 ). In addition, we introduce an output deterrent variable 
(𝑍 ), which in our context will be a violence function 𝑍 𝑓 𝑉 , 𝑆 1, with 𝑉  being the loss 
due to violence in our economy and 𝑆  is some form of State intervention to fight the levels of 
violence. If  𝑍 1, our economy is not affected by violence problems. On the other hand, if 
 𝑍 0, our economy will not be able to function properly. The average labor productivity (𝑦 ) 
is a function of the average levels of physical and human capital stocks: 
𝑦 𝐴 𝑍 𝑘 ℎ  (1) 
 
where 𝛼 0 and 𝛽 0 are the internal rates of return for physical and human capital stocks 
respectively. We also assume that 𝛼 𝛽 1. Technology is assumed to grow exogenously and 
equally for all economies. The spillovers of neighboring economies are defined by 𝛾, which is the 
spillover intensity. If 𝛾 0, neighboring economies do not affect our incumbent economy, while 
if 𝛾 1, our economy will be affected for good or for worse. When the neighboring economies 
are bigger than the incumbent is, the influence is likely to be higher. For simplicity, we assume all 
economies to have the same influence on their neighbors. The factors 𝑘  and ℎ  are the per 
capita ratios of physical, and human capital. 𝑍  denotes the violence function affecting the 
neighboring economies.  





With these neighboring effects, when physical and human capital increase, the rate of return 
will be 𝛼 𝛽 1 𝛾 . The spillover effects grow as the returns to capital and human capital 
grow. Consequently, the growth rate of 𝑦  can be expressed as 
𝑔 𝑔 𝛼𝑔 𝛽𝑔 𝛾 𝑔 𝛼𝑔 𝛽𝑔  (3) 
 
Appendix 2. Spatial Analysis 
To justify the inclusion of the spatial component in the model, i.e. if one region shows an 
influence of neighboring regions, we run the Global Moran’s I test, the Global Geary’s C test, the 
Global Getis and Ord’s G test and the Pesaran test for cross-sectional dependency. They all reject 
the null hypothesis of absence of spatial autocorrelation, such that we can confirm the presence of 
spatial dependency. To determine the type of spatial dependency, we run the Lagrange Multiplier 
(LM) tests as well as further Wald tests and conclude that the spatial component is given by a 
spatial lag of the dependent variable. This leaves us with a Spatial Lag Model. 
The spatial component is introduced by a 𝑊-matrix which is a binary contiguity weight 
matrix which is then multiplied with to state GDP per capita in surrounding states (𝑦 ) to the 
incumbent. The elements of the 𝑊-matrix are 𝑤 1 when two states share a common border 
and 𝑤 0 otherwise. This matrix is then standardized as is the usual case in the literature, such 
that the sum of each row of the matrix equals to 1.  




























Figure A3  





Table A1: Descriptive Statistics of the Allocation Variables for the Military Budget 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs. 
      
Detained People 892.38 1,313.89 5 9,483 320 
Previous Investigations 4,534.22 6,037.47 491 37,025 320 
Seized Vehicles 413.61 667.47 1 4,563 320 









Table A2: Correlation Matrix 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
(1) Log of State GDP p.c. 1.000 
              
  
(2) Log of Physical Capital 0.397 1.000 
             
  
(3) Log of Human Capital 0.569 0.326 1.000 
            
  
(4) Population Growth Rate 0.239 -0.095 0.310 1.000 
           
  
(5) Financial Crisis -0.014 -0.015 -0.001 0.145 1.000 
          
  
(6) Log of MB (Detained People) 0.163 0.108 0.193 -0.381 -0.025 1.000 
         
  
(7) Log of MB (Seized Vehicles) 0.044 -0.028 0.079 -0.418 -0.030 0.873 1.000 
        
  
(8) Log of MB (Investigations) 0.063 -0.011 0.149 -0.424 -0.068 0.848 0.807 1.000 
       
  
(9) Log of MB (PAN Voters) 0.012 0.113 0.119 -0.576 -0.092 0.737 0.708 0.834 1.000   
(10) Log of Homicide Rate 0.011 -0.260 0.052 -0.105 -0.027 0.302 0.273 0.277 0.230 1.000   
(11) Log of Kidnapping Rate 0.043 -0.074 0.101 -0.091 0.100 0.341 0.318 0.284 0.249 0.564 1.000 
    
  
(12) Log of Extortion Rate 0.089 -0.215 0.107 -0.067 0.062 0.275 0.281 0.345 0.355 0.096 0.350 1.000 
   
  
(13) Log of Car Robbery Rate 0.325 0.041 0.451 0.085 0.061 0.218 0.164 0.168 0.177 0.536 0.467 0.163 1.000 
  
  
(14) Log of Aggravated Robbery Rate 0.340 0.099 0.509 0.034 -0.039 0.348 0.249 0.354 0.356 0.405 0.446 0.251 0.515 1.000 
 
  
(15) Log of Property Crime Rate 0.149 -0.326 0.027 0.299 0.021 -0.101 -0.041 0.006 -0.124 -0.196 0.018 0.335 0.187 0.206 1.000   
(16) Log of Fraud Rate -0.044 -0.266 0.080 0.187 -0.008 -0.087 -0.007 0.005 -0.101 -0.165 0.020 0.235 0.179 0.239 0.815 1.000 







Table A3: Auxiliary Estimation Using Difference GMM 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Var.:  
Log of State GDP p.c. 
Log of MB 
(Detained People) 
Log of MB  
(Seized Vehicles) 
Log of MB 
(Investigations) 
Log of MB  
(PAN Voters) 
          
Log of State GDP p.c. 3.122 4.388 -2.391 0.636 
 
(4.956) (7.688) (3.303) (5.270) 
Log of State GDP p.c. (t-1) 1.942 3.203 -3.224 -2.665 
 
(9.428) (6.433) (4.767) (4.970) 
Log of State GDP p.c. (t-2) -3.134 -5.680 5.905 5.370 
 
(8.076) (8.026) (5.010) (5.297) 
          
Observations 256 256 256 256 
Number of States 32 32 32 32 
Number of Instruments 7 7 7 7 
Chi2 of the Wald Test 0.447 0.796 6.379* 12.66*** 
AR(1) 0.331 -0.0715 0.359 -0.407 
AR(2) 1.421 -0.362 -0.988 0.503 
Hansen Test p-value 0.368 0.454 0.336 0.356 
Note: Dependent variable: approximated Military Budget. MB is the military budget based on the allocation 









Table A4: Results for the Spatial Autoregressive Difference GMM Estimation 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dep. Var.: 







        
Log of State GDP p.c. (t-1) 0.529*** 0.483*** 0.511*** 
 (0.0191) (0.0261) (0.0189) 
Log of Physical Capital 0.275*** 0.301*** 0.285*** 
 (0.0220) (0.0232) (0.0224) 
Log of Human Capital 0.226*** 0.135*** 0.254*** 
 (0.0410) (0.0488) (0.0513) 
Population Growth Rate 1.791** 1.076* 1.361** 
 (0.696) (0.570) (0.594) 
Financial Crisis -0.0282*** -0.0260*** -0.0271*** 
 (0.00224) (0.00179) (0.00201) 
Log of Homicide Rate -0.0109***  -0.00890*** 
 (0.00183)  (0.00214) 
Log of MB (Detained People)  0.00516*** 0.00403*** 
  (0.00123) (0.00145) 
W * Log of GDP p.c. (i-1) 0.333*** 0.288*** 0.322*** 
(0.0371) (0.0238) (0.0368) 
Observations 288 288 288 
Number of States 32 32 32 
Number of Instruments 41 41 42 
Chi2 of the Wald Test 40,915*** 27,123*** 36,918*** 
Sargan Test p-value 0.9314 0.9286 0.9551 
Note: Dependent variable: Log of State GDP per capita. MB is the military 
budget allocated by the rate of detained people. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
